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Z ERO -R ATING , N ET N EUTRALITY
AND THE P ROGRESSI VE R EALISATION
OF H UMAN R IGHTS
Balaji Subramaniam†

I. I NTRODUCTION
The net neutrality debate today, specifically with respect to zero-rating, is
invariably characterised as a clash between the noble aspiration to universalise access on one hand,1 and a handful of “core values of the internet” on the
other. 2 Such framing makes for a lively dialogue – neutrality proponents can
extol the virtues of an “open internet”,3 and can argue that access universalisation is impossible, and therefore any failed attempt toward that goal is not
worth the risk of permanently altering the nature of the network.4 The most
imaginative strand of reasoning in the entire discussion is the claim that
some of the so-called “core design values” (such as the end-to-end nature of
the network) have long ceased to be a part of the internet’s architecture, and
therefore cannot be placed on a pedestal for perpetual preservation.5
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5

B.A. LL.B. (hons.) Candidate 2018, NALSAR University of Law, hyderabad.
Roslyn Layton, IGF highlights how developing countries use zero rating programs to
drive Internet adoption, Tech Policy Daily, http://www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/igf-zero-rating-programs/ (last updated Sept. 6, 2014).
See, e.g., the discussion surrounding Facebook’s dubiously christened “Free Basics” platform. Suhrith Parthasarathy, Access at the cost of Net neutrality? The hindu, oct. 8,
2015.
Tim Wu, Closing Time for the Open Internet, The New yorker, Jan. 15, 2014.
Vipul Karan Singh, Permit zero-rating schemes for a limited period, The Financial
express, Jul. 9, 2015.
Lessig and McChesney, for example, have argued that an architecture in which decisions
are made solely at the nodes while the network itself is made up of “dumb pipes”. See
Lawrence Lessig and Robert McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, Washington Post,
Jun. 8, 2006. one response to this is that networks became smart long before the net neutrality debate heated up. See Joe Weinman, Why the “stupid network” isn’t our destiny
after all, Gigaom, https://gigaom.com/2012/12/15/why-the-stupid-network-isnt-our-destiny-after-all/ (last updated Dec. 15, 2012).
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In its essence, current scholarship on zero-rating is oriented towards presenting the subject as a clash between competing but more or less co-equal
interests.6 Proponents of net neutrality argue that zero-rating would stifle
innovation7 and distort consumer choice to create internet oligopolies8 – in
a nutshell, that the practice is “anti-competitive, patronizing, and counter-productive”.9 Advocates of zero-rating need only point to the virtues of
universal internet access – bridging the digital divide,10 as it were. It is possible, however, to re-articulate these values in terms that could transcend such
a clash of interests. The choice between complete adherence to the principles
of net neutrality on the one hand, and zero-rating some contention the other,
can be made easier by reframing the debate between norms that are hierarchically related. This is the utility offered by a human rights perspective to
the discourse around zero-rating – it makes it possible to obviate the current
debate by characterising it as a clash between unequal norms in which one
has to clearly trump the other.
over this article, I argue that it is possible to carry out such a reformulation, and that this reformulation results in the subordination of some
values to greater human rights claims. In Part I, I attempt to establish that
internet access is fundamentally linked to the effective delivery of several
human rights. In Part II, a model that optimises the realisation of the human
rights claims previously enumerated is outlined. In Part III, the circumstances under which the human rights approach would be incompatible with
the zero-rating debate is examined, which is then used to further refine the
model.
Before we begin, I must set out a caveat.11 It must be emphasised that the
primary thrust of this article is not that there exists a legal justification for
zero-rating. human rights standards derive their importance not just from
6

7

8

9

10

11

The Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, provides us with an excellent example. See
Geetha hariharan, The Hazards of a Non-neutral Internet, The Centre for Internet
and Society, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-week-april-18-2015-geetha-hariharan-hazards-of-non-neutral-internet (last updated Apr. 18, 2015).
Marcus Wohlsen, Free mobile data plans are going to crush the start-up economy, Wired,
http://www.wired.com/2014/08/free-mobile-data-plans-are-going-to-crush-the-startupeconomy/ (last updated Jan. 8, 2014).
Jason Koebler, So this is how net neutrality dies, Motherboard, http://motherboard.
vice.com/read/so-this-is-how-net-neutrality-dies (last updated Nov. 19, 2015).
Susan Crawford, Zero for Conduct, Medium, https://medium.com/backchannel/lessthan-zero-199bcb05a868#.es734hctb (last updated Jan. 7, 2015).
The term “digital divide” has been the subject of consistent criticism for its lack of emphasis on the socio-economic nature of the problem. See Govindan Parayil, The Digital Divide
and Increasing Returns: Contradictions of Informational Capitalism, 21(1) Information
Society 41, 48 (2005).
Whether this is a carefully nuanced position or a cowardly cop-out is, of course, for the
reader to decide.
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the fact that they are paramount legal obligations (Kelsenian grundnorms,
if you will) but also from the fact that they are paramount policy obligations – no governmental policy can be said to be legitimate unless it operates in optimal consonance with them. The upshot of this distinction is that
although governments may not be legally required to permit or encourage
zero-rating (for reasons such as the non-state nature of most ISPs, for example), it would still be appropriate from a policy perspective for them to do so.
Re-framing the net neutrality debate in the language of human rights
is vitally important, especially if one buys into the Dworkinian view of
rights as “trumps”.12 Dworkin (and his intellectual predecessors, such as J.S.
Mill)13 advocated the view that rights-based justifications occupied a superior position relative to non-rights objectives such as market efficiency and
ordinary public policy considerations.
In addition, more recent scholarship has argued that while rights are
themselves hierarchically higher than non-rights considerations, there also
exists a hierarchy inter se among them, much like an ace wins out over a
knave despite the fact that both are trumps.14 Given that international standards represent the most basic and universally accepted versions of human
rights, it follows that even among trumps, policy decisions that can be linked
to the realisation of human rights guaranteed by binding international treaties such as the ICCPR and the ICeSCR must claim priority.

II. I S THERE

A

R IGHT

TO

I NTERNET ACCESS?

In order for us to justify zero-rating as a difficult way to achieve important
human rights goals, we must first establish that these goals exist in the first
place. Many before me have asked whether there exists a right to access
the internet, and many have answered this question in several ways. Vint
Cerf famously wrote an opinion piece titled “Internet access is not a human
right”,15 while fellow internet pioneer Tim Berners-Lee appears to be in clear
disagreement.16
12
13

14

15
16

Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps in Jeremy Waldron, Theories of Rights (1984).
In Mill’s words, “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no
more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be in silencing mankind.” See J.S. Mill, on Liberty and other essays 20 (S. Collini ed., 1989).
Alan Gewirth, Are there any absolute rights? in Jeremy Waldron, Theories of Rights
(1984).
Vinton Cerf, Internet access is not a human right, The New york Times, Jan. 4, 2012.
In expressing such disagreement, however, Berners-Lee does two things that are remarkably relevant to our discussion – he emphasizes the need to break down economic barriers
to access on the one hand, while simultaneously expressing a commitment to net neutrality
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A. Locating a Right of Access: Three Approaches
In this section, I argue that it is possible to argue that there exists a human
right to access the internet, and that such a right can find its roots in three
distinct strands of reasoning.

B. Internet Access as a Civil and Political Right
It is possible to argue that internet access is inseparable from the right to
form informed opinions (as under Art. 19(1) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights) and the freedom of expression (as under Art.
19(2) of the ICCPR and Art. 19 of the Universal Declaration of human
Rights), as also the right to associate with other human beings (as under
Art. 22 of the ICCPR and Art. 20(1) of the UDhR).17 The internet serves to
democratise speech in more than one way. The internet protects speech in
an unprecedented way – by cloaking the speaker in anonymity, it allows the
free expression of views that would normally incur the wrath of regimes,
both governmental and societal. The anonymity afforded by the network
is vital to the protection of subaltern speech – arguably speech that is in
greatest need of protection.18 The link between online expression and offline
democratisation is self-evident, and has been recognised by the UN’s Special
Rapporteur on the Freedom of expression and opinion.19
The second important feature of the internet is the virtual eradication of
entry barriers to publication. By allowing everyone with access to the network to create and disseminate content at virtually no cost, the internet revolutionises the freedom to broadcast opinions and expression. Anonymity
and ease of publishing are important because while these features possess
substantial value for mainstream speech, their true attraction lies in the

17

18

19

on the other. “It’s time to recognize the internet as a basic human right. That means guaranteeing affordable access for all, ensuring internet packets are delivered without commercial or political discrimination, and protecting the privacy and freedom of web users
regardless of where they live.”, quoted in World Wide Web inventor says Internet should
be ‘human right’, Mashable, http://mashable.com/2014/12/11/tim-berners-lee-net-neutrality/#rUM8nl.nh5qa (last updated Dec. 11, 2014).
Scott edwards, Is Internet Access a Human Right?, Amnesty International Blog,
http://blog.amnestyusa.org/business/is-internet-access-a-human-right/ (last updated Jan.
10, 2012).
Bruce Bimber, The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community and
Accelerated Pluralism, 31(1) Polity 133 (1998).
Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, United Nations human
Rights Council, May 16, 2011, UN Doc. A/hRC/17/27.
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emancipatory potential they represent for subaltern speech. 20 The interplay
between these two factors – anonymity and ease of publication – is of crucial
importance. A publishing syndicate that charged a few thousand dollars to
print anonymous pamphlets would be just as useless to the activist citizen as
an open publisher that printed and disseminated literature for no charge, on
the sole condition that the author remain identifiable. For this reason, any
variant of internet access that does not provide both anonymity and ease of
publication cannot claim to realise civil and political rights in the manner
outlined in this paper.

C. Internet Access as an Economic, Social and Cultural
Right
Another articulation of a right to internet access is based on the assumption that the internet is essential for its economic, social and cultural attributes. The effect of internet access on the right to education (Art. 26 of the
UDhR, Art. 13 of the International Covenant on economic, Social and
Cultural Rights) has been well-documented in europe, 21 with the european
Parliament even adopting a recommendation stating that ensuring universal
internet access could be equated to universalising the right to education. 22
‘Access to Knowledge’ scholarship suggests that access to the internet has
a transformative effect on A2K in three ways: first, it amplifies the reach
and efficiency of traditional forms of knowledge transfer; second, it makes
knowledge available on demand; third, it allows individuals to tap into the
wisdom of groups, a sort of “global knowledge commons” that would otherwise never have existed. 23
Access to the internet also allows (and in some cases is essential to) the
realisation of other values framed in human rights rhetoric, such as the
“right to science and culture”, 24 or the right to access marketplaces. 25
20

21

22

23

24
25

For a brilliant example of such potential being realised on the ground, see Claude Marks
and Rob McBride, Recovering, Amplifying and Networking the Voices of the Disappeared
– Political Prisoners on Internet Media, 30(2) Social Justice 135 (2003).
See, e.g., Paul De hert and Dariusz Kloza, Internet (access) as a new fundamental right.
Inflating the current rights framework? 3 european J. of L. & Tech. 3 (2012).
European Parliament recommendation of 26 March 2009 to the Council on strengthening
security and fundamental freedoms on the Internet, european Parliament, Document
ID: P6_TA (2009)0194.
Lea Shaver, Defining and Measuring A2K: A Blueprint for an Index of Access to
Knowledge, 4 I/S: J.L. &Pol’yfor Info. Soc’y 235, 247 (2008).
Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010(1) Wisc. L. Rev. 121 (2010).
Nicola Lucchi, Freedom of expression and the right of access to the Internet: A new fundamental right? in Routledge handbook of Media Law 157 (Monroe e. Price, et. al.
eds., 2013).
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D. Internet Access as a Participative Right
Another way to assert the existence of a right to internet access is by arguing that the advent of ICTs has fundamentally altered the manner in which
the entire constellation of pre-existing rights can be exercised. The current
rights paradigm presupposes a vast number of features that characterise the
physical world, but which may not exist in the digital world. With the movement of people, societies and institutions to the digital world, the absence
of these features may necessitate a radical re-articulation of the rights that
already exist.
Jack Balkin makes a proto-argument on these lines in the context of the
freedom of expression – he argues that new technologies such as the internet are not merely linked to the freedom of expression, but redefine it (by
“changing the social conditions of speech”), necessitating the evolution of
new norms to adequately guarantee the right.26 In a world where freedom of
expression is premised upon access to the medium, it is obvious that barriers
to the latter would unquestionably restrict the former.
It would appear that Balkin’s argument can be broadened significantly to
prompt a rethinking of the very notion of participation in society. The right
to participate in society is both instrumental to the exercise of other rights
(such as freedom of speech and association), and also an a priori right, on
its own merits. The UDhR recognises this in Art. 27(1), and the manner
in which mass migration to digital societies affects pre-existing rights can
be best explained through an example. We can use the metaphor of the
town hall or village square – earlier human rights frameworks only articulated a right to public participation, and did not specifically provide for
a right to access public spaces, because geographical freedoms (including
the right of free movement) in the real world ensured that everyone could
reasonably reach nearby public spaces and make themselves heard. With the
advent of digital societies (or “information societies”), however, the right
of free participation in society and culture becomes conditional upon the
ability of individuals to access these public spaces. In short, digital societies
require that the conditions implicit or presumed in pre-existing rights be
made explicit separately. This is a line of reasoning that has close parallels to
“incompletely theorised agreements” in constitutional law, where it has been
used to (consciously or otherwise) “discover” new rights. 27
26

27

Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 74 N.y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2004); Jack Balkin, How Rights Change:
Freedom of Speech in the Digital Era, 26(1) Sydney L. Rev. 5 (2004).
Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorised Agreements, 108(7) harv. L. Rev. 1733 (1995).
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E. Conceptual Problems Surrounding the Access Right
The current debate on whether there exists a human right to internet access
is largely centred on state interventions that curtail it. 28 This brings with it
two subsidiary problems: first, human rights obligations are perceived to rest
exclusively upon states; second, these obligations are seen to be merely negative duties. The former is outside the scope of this article, since we embarked
on this journey on the understanding that we were looking for policy justifications, rather than legal justifications for zero-rating. 29 As for the latter, it
must be said that although large parts of the human rights debate currently
revolve around the right against disconnection (such as the French hADoPI
legislation30), 31 there remains significant backing for the existence of a positive obligation to universalise internet access.32 Further, several states have
interpreted their human rights obligations as inclusive of such a duty.33 The
most striking example can be seen in the Greek constitution, which asserts
that “All persons have the right to participate in the Information Society.
Facilitation of access to electronically transmitted information, as well as of
the production, exchange and diffusion thereof, constitutes an obligation of
the State, always in observance of the guarantees of articles 9, 9A and 19.”34
It is possible to argue that the standards governing human rights delivery
are applicable to the universalisation of internet access even without presupposing an independent human right of access, since internet access has
been recognised to be an essential component of the human rights regime
as a whole.35
28
29

30

31

32
33

34

35

La Rue, supra n. 19 at ¶¶28-59.
Nevertheless, there is a case to be made for human rights obligations to accrue to private
actors. one way in which this can be achieved is to impose a positive obligation on States
Parties to ensure that private parties are prevented from infringing these human rights,
as exemplified by the UNhRC in the context of the right to privacy and the prohibition
on torture. See CCPR General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on
States Parties to the Covenant, United Nations human Rights Committee, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) at ¶8.
Siraj Datoo, France drops controversial ‘Hadopi law’ after spending millions, The
Guardian, Jul. 9, 2013.
Nicolas Suzor and Brian Fitzgerald, The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in
Copyright Law, 34(1) UNSW L. Rev. 1 (2011).
La Rue, supra n. 19 at ¶¶60-66.
See, e.g., Bobbie Johnson, Finland makes broadband access a legal right, The Guardian,
oct. 14, 2009; see also Sentence 12790 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Costa Rica, Jul. 30, 2010, http://200.91.68.20/pj/scij/busqueda/jurisprudencia/
jur_texto_sentencia.asp?nValor2=483874&tem1=013141&param7=0&lResultado=3&nValor1=1&strTipM=T&strLib=LIB (last accessed Nov. 22, 2015).
Article 5A of the Constitution of Greece, as revised by the parliamentary resolution of
April 6, 2001.
David Fidler, Cyberspace and human rights, in Research handbook on International
Law and Cyberspace 94 (Nicholas Tsagourias and Russell Buchan eds., 2015).
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A. Unpacking Progressive realisation
The principle of progressive realisation, enshrined in Art. 2(1) of the
ICeSCR, 36 allows states a certain amount of flexibility in their obligation
to guarantee the rights contained in the Covenant when contrasted with
the traditional “immediate and absolute” realisation standard.37 Three
features of the progressive realisation standard are of paramount importance to its applicability in the context of zero-rating and internet access
universalisation.
First, it entails immediate and tangible progress towards rights realisation. This requirement implies that states are under an obligation to ensure
that regardless of overall economic constraints, resources at any specific
point in time must be optimally utilised to maximise the realisation of the
right.38
Second, it creates a strong presumption of non-compliance where retrogressive measures are imposed. Regression can be in either of two forms
– regression of results or normative regression. Regression of results occurs
when state policy remains constant, but the delivery of right-realising public
goods declines qualitatively or quantitatively. Normative regression simply
refers to a situation in which the realisation of a right is restricted through
a change that limits the application of the state policy that enabled such
realisation in the first place.39 Retrogressive measures must be justified by
the state taking them40 as being necessary in the face of exceptional circumstances.41 Significantly, one situation that appears to permit retrogressive

36

37

38

39

40
41

Art. 2(1) states as follows: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”
CESCR General Comment 3, The nature of States parties obligations, United Nations
human Rights Council, Dec. 14, 1990.
Principle 23, The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1987). CESCR General
Comment 13, The right to education, United Nations human Rights Council, UN
Doc. e/C.12/1999/10 (1999).
Christian Courtis (ed.), Ni un paso atras. La prohibicion de regresividad en materia de derechos sociales (2006).
Supra n. 34 at ¶9.
CESCR General Comment 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health,
United Nations human Rights Council, UN Doc. e/C.12/2000/4 (2000) at ¶34.
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measures would be where such retrogression is necessary to achieve equity
in the realisation of the right.42
Third, it places an obligation on states to institute special measures for
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.43 While this obligation has primarily
been articulated in the context of marginalised groups such as persons with
disabilities,44 it does not preclude the application of a positive duty upon
states to create tailored measures that enable other disproportionately disadvantaged groups to realise their rights.45
Before we apply the standard to zero-rating, one final point needs to be
addressed. In the previous section, I argued that the right of internet access
could be articulated as a civil-political right as well as a socio-economic
right. however, throughout this section, we have primarily seen progressive realisation as a standard applicable only to socio-economic rights. Does
this mean that civil-political rights are not progressively realisable? This is
not so. Recent scholarship has acknowledged that civil-political rights are
resource-dependent46 in the same way as socio-economic rights are,47 and
therefore subject to being progressively achieved.48

B. Applying the Doctrine to Zero-rating
We can now examine whether compliance with the (moral, if not legal)
duty to progressively realise the right to internet access can be achieved by
zero-rating content on the web. The definition of zero-rating that I use is
as follows: zero-rating is the provision of a pre-defined set of web services
and applications at zero cost to the subscriber. Neither do I interrogate the
42

43

44

45

46

47

48

Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-economic Rights Adjudication under a
Transformative Constitution 189 (2010).
Lillian Chenwi, Unpacking “progressive realisation”, its relation to resources, minimum
core and reasonableness, and some methodological considerations for assessing compliance, 46(3) De Jure 742 (2013).
CESCR General Comment 5, Persons with Disabilities, United Nations human
Rights Council, UN Doc. e/1995/22 (1994) at ¶9.
Govt. of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 ZACC 19 (Constitutional
Court of South Africa).
M. Magdalena Sepulveda, The Nature of the obligations under the
International Covenant on economic, Social and Cultural Rights 311 (2003).
henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy 13
(1996); Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social
Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law 227 (2008).
“The fact that the full realization of most economic, social and cultural rights can only be
achieved progressively, which in fact also applies to most civil and political rights, does not
alter the nature of the legal obligation of States which requires that certain steps be taken
immediately and others as soon as possible.” (emphasis supplied) Maastricht Guidelines
on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) at ¶8.
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secondary question of how zero-rating implementations are funded – they
could be through ad revenue,49 government subsidies to ISPs, private bargains in which the content provider pays the access provider,50 or purely
philanthropic initiatives with no exchange of payment whatsoever.51 Nor do
I seek to question the assumption that access providers face significant infrastructure costs that preclude them from universalising access without passing on the cost of connection to either the subscriber or the content provider.
In its essence, my claim is that in the situation that we are faced with right
now, zero-rating content is a way to comply with our duty to progressively
realise the right to internet access. having understood that it is impossible
to realise the right overnight to its fullest extent, we must ask ourselves if
our human rights obligations are still discharged by instantly universalising
access to some parts of the internet by zero-rating them.
It is here that each feature of progressive realisation earlier outlined
comes into its own. The demand for tangible progress, when coupled with
the obligation to maximise rights realisation, imposes upon governments
the moral duty to encourage zero-rating since it represents tangible progress
for marginalised groups.52 The prohibition on regression is important for
two reasons. First, because it ensures that access providers cannot engage in
willy-nilly withdrawal of services (thus creating a regression of results), and
because it ensures that governments cannot reduce budgetary allocations to
full access universalisation projects (thus creating a normative regression)
without adequate justification. Second, because it explicitly allows governments to implement ostensibly retrogressive measures (such as encouraging the proliferation of ‘walled gardens’) if such measures serve to enhance
the ‘equitable’ realisation of the right. Finally, the obligation on states to

49

50

51

52

See, e.g., opera Software’s Sponsored Web Pass. http://www.operasoftware.com/products/operators/sponsored-web-pass (last accessed Nov. 22, 2015).
See, e.g., AT&T’s Sponsored Data. http://www.att.com/att/sponsoreddata/en/index.html
(last accessed Nov. 22, 2015).
See, e.g., Wikipedia Zero, erik Moeller, Wikipedia Zero and Net Neutrality: Protecting
the Internet as a Public Space, Wikimedia Blog, http://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/08/01/
wikipedia-zero-and-net-neutrality-protecting-the-internet/ (last updated Aug. 1, 2014).
There is also an ethical argument to be made here in favour of zero-rating. The claim that
zero-rating must be discouraged since it would make an insignificant difference to the lives
of marginalised subscribers while simultaneously upsetting an abstractly defined “core
fabric” of the internet is untenable, since it suffers from a size illusion. Abstract competing considerations such as the “core values” of the network have no a priori value when
weighed against the tangible rights claims of individuals, and the mere fact that providing
access to a small subset of the internet will make an insignificant difference does not undermine the duty to enhance the realisation (no matter how insignificantly) of human rights.
See Jonathan Glover, It makes no difference whether or not I do it’, in Applied ethics
125, 127 (Peter Singer ed., 1986).
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implement targeted measures to enable vulnerable communities to realise
their right fits in perfectly with the core mission of zero-rating initiatives.
In the worst case scenario, zero-rating would act as a sort of differential tax on internet access, with the privileged effectively paying the costs
of access universalisation either directly (in the form of increased monetary costs to fund a government subsidy, or increased content costs brought
about by the need for content providers to pass on the costs of zero-rating to
paying consumers) or indirectly (in the form of suffering distortions to competition or innovation in the internet marketplace). I believe that such costs
are justified, because a reduction in the value of the internet or an increase
in the cost of connectivity for paying subscribers in order to increase access
for hitherto marginalised groups is well within the scope of enhancing the
‘equitable’ realisation of the right to internet access.
In summary, then, compliance with the obligation of progressive realisation renders it necessary for governments to encourage zero-rated content delivery because such delivery promises to bring in tangible progress,
because progressive realisation protects subscribers from abuse by providers
through its prohibition on regressive measures, and because the universalisation of internet access would further the equitable realisation of human
rights despite the costs incurred by paying subscribers.

IV. AVOIDING

THE

GIFT

OF THE

M AGI

over the course of this exercise, however, we must be careful not to miss the
forest for the trees.53 Universalisation of internet access will be meaningless
if the manner in which such it is conducted kills the very values that internet
access represents. Access universalisation is a means to an end, and the end
will most certainly be defeated if we build a world in which every individual
has access to an internet54 that does not, in any way, enable her to realise her
freedom of expression, right to education, or right to participate effectively
in the information society. This may not be the only point of failure for a
universalisation model based on zero-rating, but it is certainly an immediate mission failure if access universalisation renders the internet devoid of
53

54

The title of this section is a reference to o’henry’s short story, in which a husband and
wife present each other with hair accessories and a watch chain by selling off their hair and
wristwatch respectively in a touching but otherwise utterly useless display of affection. We
must remember that posterity will not forgive us for making the same mistake in discharging human rights imperatives as easily as Jim and Della Dillingham forgave each other on
Christmas eve.
As opposed to “the internet”.
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the very values sought to be universalised. We must therefore ask ourselves
what these values are, and whether they may be seriously jeopardised by
zero-rating.
With respect to the internet’s role in enhancing the realisation of the
freedom of expression, we have identified two essential attributes – user
anonymity and the lowering of barriers to publication. existing zero-rating platforms (such as Facebook’s Internet.org)55 have certainly come under
heavy criticism for their architectural rejection of anonymity-enhancing
tools such as encryption. however, there is nothing to prevent the legislation of these values into the system – zero-rating (or its viability, economic
or otherwise) is not conditional upon the rejection of anonymity. Indeed,
encryption has been embraced (to a limited extent) by the very ventures that
were criticised for rejecting it. 56 As for barriers to publication, nothing about
zero-rating puts it in conflict with allowing subscribers to amplify their voice
on the internet. ISPs gain nothing from narrowing the reach of content on
the internet – zero-rating is essentially a “last mile” distributive problem that
has nothing to do with how far content travels within the worldwide network. While legislation could prevent anonymity from being compromised
in zero-rated services, I submit that market forces will ensure that the most
populous social networks are always within the reach of zero-rated content consumers. This is because ISP interests are served by giving consumers
what they want, and there exists adequate competition in the market for
large social networks and blogging platforms that allow for wide publication, so that any of them should be able to persuade access providers to zerorate their services. In any event, the widespread mirroring and archiving on
the internet means that content is rarely tied down to the website in which it
originated, meaning that the selection of zero-rated websites by any individual access provider should exercise no influence on the reach of the content
accessed or disseminated on the provider’s network.
With respect to the right to education and A2K concerns, the success
of the Wikipedia Zero project57 must surely be evidence enough that if
properly executed, zero-rating could prove to be the most important A2K
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tool yet developed in collecting, preserving and disseminating community
knowledge.
The most interesting conflict between zero-rating and the rights sought
to be guaranteed through it arises when we speak of the participative value
of internet access. If access universalisation is predicated upon the establishment of ‘walled gardens’, then how can we ensure that these walls do
not prevent the inhabitants of our information society from reaching out
into ‘public spaces’ on the internet? Admittedly, this presents a challenge
insofar as it necessitates a delineation and separation of public and private
spaces online. While there exists a school of thought which holds that it is
impossible to effect such a distinction, 58 there remains an argument to be
made that such distinctions can be made on a case-by-case basis, through an
examination of the potential for public participation that any given space on
the internet offers.59 Governmental regulation of zero-rating can make such
case-by-case decisions under pre-existing adjudicatory framework.60
on the whole, therefore, it is possible to establish that there exists a
strong argument to be made in favour of zero-rating being a way for states
to comply with their progressive realisation obligations under the international human rights regime, especially given that it can be executed without
fundamentally altering the values of the internet sought to be universalised.

V. CONCLUSION
The claim that zero-rating is intrinsically linked with the discharge of fundamental human rights obligations has the potential to drastically alter the net
neutrality debate. If it is successful (and I believe that it is), then it effectively
frees us from the burden of having to engage with the effect zero-rating will
have on competition, or innovation, or the “nature of the internet”. This is
because human rights claims occupy a higher position in our legal, moral
and political imagination than vague claims of market efficiency or innovation incentivization. Further, arguments that zero-rating would undermine
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consumer interests by concentrating power in the hands of access providers
would still be unable to compete with human rights claims.
once we have established that there exists a right to access the internet,
and that this right can best be progressively realised by the universal delivery
of zero-rated content, then it follows that we must encourage zero-rating
regardless of its pernicious effects on consumer choice, competition, efficiency, innovation or power, since all these competing claims are subordinate to our fundamental duty to progressively realise basic human rights.

